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1  Introduction 
The  Aghion-Marinescu  paper  begins  by  stating  a  view  I  share:  Good 
macroeconomic  policy  helps  growth  (by  which  I  mean  growth  in the near 
term).  I do  not  think  this  view  is  in any  dispute  in  the  applied  and  policy 
world,  but  once  in a  while  we  academics  manage  to create  our  own  puz 
zles.  Credit  goes  to Aghion-Marinescu  for  avoiding  this  trap. 
Of  course,  it  is one  thing  to  claim  that  there  is a  link  between  macro 
economic  policy  and  growth,  and  another  to measure  the  extent  of  the 
impact  of  the  former  on  the  latter.  This  paper  sets  out  to do  this mea 
surement.  In particular,  it uses  OECD  panel  data  to  measure  the  degree 
of  countercyclicality  of  fiscal  policy  in different  countries  at  different 
points  in  time,  and,  more  importantly,  to  measure  the  growth  benefit  of 
having  a more  countercyclicality  fiscal  policy.  The  authors  find  that 
there  is a  large  benefit,  particularly  when  financial  markets  are  less  de 
veloped  (even  within  the OECD).  They  also  point  out  that  EMU  coun 
tries have  not  followed  the  rest  of  the OECD  countries  in becoming  more 
countercyclical  over  time,  and  that  their  financial  markets  are  less  so 
phisticated  than  those  of  the United  States  and  United  Kingdom;  hence, 
they would  benefit  significantly  from  catching  up  on  countercyclicality. 
Unfortunately,  while  I'm  receptive  to  their  conclusions,  I do  not  think 
they  have  been  successful  in providing  solid  evidence  for  their  sensible 
case.  Their  method  is not  convincing.  For  example,  the main  equation 
has  variables  with  a different  order  of  integration  on  the  right  and  left 
hand  sides,  and  there  is no  specific  discussion  of  causality,  of  the  eco 
nomic  factors  behind  the  time-varying  nature  of  their  countercyclicality 
measure,  of why  the  frequency  of  their  data  is the  right  frequency  for  the 
question  at hand,  of  the  source  of  identification,  and  so  on. 
Since  I am  not  persuaded  by  their  evidence,  and  since  Anil  Kashyap, 280  Caballero 
the  other  discussant,  will  focus  on  their  procedures  and  data,  I  will  turn 
to  something  else.  I  will  briefly  address  three  sets  of  questions  that  nat 
urally  arise  when  reading  the Aghion-Marinescu  paper: 
Are  recessions  particularly  bad  for growth?  How? 
Why  is fiscal  policy  procyclical  (or  less  countercyclical  than  in the pre 
ferred  model)  in  practice?  Does  procyclicality  increase  aggregate 
volatility? 
Is the European  problem  one  of  excess  volatility?  Would  the  adoption 
of  a more  flexible  fiscal  rule  give  a  significant  boost  to  growth?  If  so, 
what  is  the  channel? 
2  Are  Recessions  Bad  for Growth?  How? 
There  are  two  polar  views  about  the  effect  of  recessions  on  economic 
growth.  At  one  end,  there  is  the  liquidationist  view,  which  sees  a benefit 
in  recessions.  The  following  quote  from  Schumpeter  (1934)  exemplifies 
this  perspective:  "depressions  are  not  simply  evils,  which  we  might  at 
tempt  to  suppress,  but  ...  forms  of  something  which  has  to be  done, 
namely,  adjustment  to  ... 
change." 
At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum  is  the  inefficient  private  separations 
view,  which  focuses  on  the  fact  that  liquidations  are  concentrated  dur 
ing  recessions.  The  argument  is  that  these  large-scale  job  losses  and  as 
sociated  financial  distress  cause  significant  economic  waste,  which  we 
should  find  a  way  to avoid. 
Who  is right?  In  my  work  with  Mohamad  Hammour  we  have  argued 
that  probably  neither?or  both,  to  some  extent.1  Instead,  we  advocate  a 
reverse-liquidationist  perspective,  which  states  that  a  recession  is  costly 
(as  the  inefficient  private  separations  view  has  it) because  it depresses  re 
structuring  (i.e.,  a Schumpeterian  mechanism). 
Figure  4C1.1  presents  one  piece  of  evidence  for  this  reverse 
liquidationist  perspective.  It shows  the  impulse  response  to a  recession 
ary  shock  of minus-employment  (panel  a),  job  creation  and  destruction 
(panel  b),  and  the  cumulative  creation  and  destruction  (panel  c),  for U.S. 
manufacturing.2  The  first panel  reflects  the path  of  unemployment  (mi 
nus-employment)  during  the  recession  and  recovery  phases.  The  sec 
ond  panel  shows  the  rise  in  liquidations  (job destruction)  at  the  onset  of 
the  recession.  It  is  this  rise  that  has  led  people  to  conclude  that  restruc 
turing  rises  in  recessions.  But  we  argue  that  this  interpretation  is  mis 
leading  since  there  is no  commensurate  rise  in  creation.  Instead,  one 
should  look  at  the whole  recession-recovery  episode  and  study  whether Panel  (a):  Aggr.  Impulse (minus) Employment 
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Figure  4C1.1 
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the  initial  spike  in destruction  is  indeed  followed  by  a  rise  in  creation. 
The  bottom  panel  does  exactly  this.  It  shows  the  cumulative  creation 
(and  destruction)  from  the  onset  of  the  recession  to  the  time  indicated  in 
the  horizontal  axis.  The  evidence  in  this  case  clearly  points  against  the 
increased-restructuring  hypothesis.  Quite  the  opposite,  there  is  signifi 
cant  evidence  that  recessions  depress  restructuring. 
The  evidence  on  depressed  restructuring  during  recessions  extends  be 
yond  U.S.  manufacturing  jobs.  In fact,  it is even more  pronounced  for asset 
restructuring.  See,  for  example,  the  evidence  for merger  waves  in Golbe 
and White  (1987)  and  for physical  capital  in Eisfeldt  and  Rampini  (2006). 
Sometimes  depressed  restructuring  results  from  financial  and  other 
frictions  within  the private  sectors.  In others,  it is  the  result  of  an  inade 
quate  policy  response  to  recessionary  shocks,  such  as  that which  fol 
lowed  the burst  in  the  Japanese  bubble  in  the  early  1990s  (see Caballero, 
Kashyap,  and  Hoshi  2006)  and  the  tightening  in dismissal  laws  in Eu 
rope  following  the  oil  shocks  of  the  1970s  (see,  e.g.,  Caballero  and Ham 
mour  1998). 
Depressed  restructuring  is  important  because  there  is plenty  of  evi 
dence  that  restructuring  is  a  central  mechanism  behind  productivity 
growth  (e.g.,  Baily  et  al.  1992,  Bartelsman  and  Dhrymes  1994,  and  Bar 
telsman,  Haltiwanger,  and  Scarpetta  2004).  For  example,  the  evidence 
in Foster,  Haltiwanger,  and  Krizen  et  al.  (2001)  shows  that  reallocation 
can  account  for  over  50  percent  of  the  10-year  productivity  gains  in 
U.S.  manufacturing  between  1977  and  1987.  Building  on  this  evidence, 
which  we  combined  with  a  model  of  creative-destruction,  we  concluded 
in  Caballero  and  Hammour  (2005)  that  depressed  restructuring  ac 
counts  for  about  a  third  of  the  cost  of  a  recession  in  the United  States.3 
3  Why  Is Fiscal  Policy  Procyclical  in Practice? 
Does  It  Increase  Volatility? 
The  authors  study  OECD  countries,  but  most  of  the  patterns  they  de 
scribe  are  even  more  pronounced  in  emerging-market  economies.  In 
particular,  fiscal  policy  is  less  countercyclical  and more  related  to  finan 
cial  development  in emerging  markets  than  in advanced  economies. 
Table  4C1.1  illustrates  the  correlation  between  GDP  growth  and  dif 
ferent  measures  of  fiscal  policy  for  a  few  examples  and  the medians  of 
each  group  (emerging  and  advanced  economies).  The  pattern  is evident: 
in  the  typical  emerging-market  economy,  fiscal  policy  is either  procycli 
cal  or mildly  countercyclical,  at  best.  In  contrast,  advanced  economies 
exhibit  much  stronger  evidence  of  countercyclicality. Comment  283 
Table  4C1.1 
Procyclicality  of  Fiscal  Policy 
Public Deficit, GDP  (%)  Government  Expenditures, GDP  (%) 
Argentina  1.96  83.03 
Brazil  28.37  50.83 
Italy  -52.69  -37.94 
Emerging  (median)  -4.41  45.60 
Advanced  (median)  -47.09  9.08 
Table  4C1.2 
Procyclicality  of  Fiscal  Variables  and  Financial  Development 
Dependent  Variable:  Expenditures  Public  Deficit 
Correlation  of:  and  GDP  and  GDP 
Private  credit 
OLS  -0.093  -0.098 
(0.007)  (0.027) 
IV  -0.290  -0.374 
(0.048)  (0.004) 
Number  of  countries  90  90 
Liquid  liabilities 
OLS  -0.157  -0.100 
(0.003)  (0.073) 
IV  -0.505  -0.439 
(0.019)  (0.008) 
Number  of  countries  85  85 
Note:  Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  in parentheses. 
Table  4C1.2  uses  different  measures  of  financial  development  to show 
that  the  correlation  between  GDP  and  fiscal  policy  decreases  with  fi 
nancial  development. 
Why  is  fiscal  policy  procyclical  in emerging  markets?  I believe  there 
are  two main  types  of  factors.  One  of  them  is political;  the  other  is  fi 
nancial  constraints.  The  political  economy  literature  has  elaborated  ex 
tensively  on  the  former,  and  some  of  this  discussion  is  reviewed  in  the 
Aghion-Marinescu  paper.  However,  in  many  instances  bad  policies  are 
just  that.  There  are  plenty  of  bad  economic  ideas  floating  around  and 
countries  in  more  dire  circumstances  are more  likely  to adopt  them. 
One  of  the  distinctive  features  of  emerging-market  recessions  is  that 
they  often  come  together  with  a  sudden  stop  of  capital  inflows,  which 
creates  great  financial  distress  in both  the private  and  public  sectors.  In 284 Caballero 
this  context,  crowding  out  becomes  a much  more  serious  issue  with 
which  to be  concerned.  Table  4C1.3  estimates  the  extent  of  crowding  out 
in emerging  and  advanced  economies.  It shows  the  result  of  running  a 
regression  of  private  investment  on  public  debt,  episodes  of  crises  /re 
cessions,  and  the  interaction  between  these  two.  The  most  interesting 
coefficient  is  the  interaction,  as  it shows  that  during  crises  in emerging 
markets  crowding  out  is very  extreme.  The  absolute  value  of  the  sum  of 
the  coefficients  associated  to public  debt  exceeds  1 during  crises.  In con 
trast,  crises  have  no  effect  on  crowding  out  in advanced  economies,  and 
the  degree  of  crowding  out  overall  is  much  smaller. 
The  point,  then,  is that depending  on  the nature  of  the  shocks  and  con 
straints  faced  by  a country,  there  are  times  when  procyclical  fiscal  policy 
is the optimal  response.  When  this  is the  case,  a procyclical  policy  damp 
ens  rather  than  exacerbates  volatility. 
4  Is  the  European  Problem  One  of  Excess  Volatility? 
The  paper  argues  that  if EMU  economies  were  to  adopt  more  counter 
cyclical  policies  they  would  reduce  aggregate  volatility,  which  in  turn 
would  increase  growth.  While  I am  in  favor  of more  countercyclical 
policies  in the EMU  economies,  I am  not  persuaded  that  their main  prob 
lem  is one  of  excess  volatility.  Table  4C1.4  shows  that  aggregate  volatil 
ity  in  the EMU  economies,  and  particularly  in  its  main  economies,  is ac 
tually  lower  than  that  of  the United  States. 
Lack  of flexibility  of microeconomic  policy  is probably  a  much  more  se 
rious  problem  behind  weak  European  growth.  Having  said  this,  I also  be 
lieve  that  at  this  juncture  there  is a  connection  between  these  two  forms 
of  flexibility  (macro  and micro).  The  reason  is  that  the  political  momen 
tum  for  reforms,  which  was  initially  boosted  by  bad macroeconomic  out 
comes,  may  be  lost  in  the  absence  of  a  short-run  improvement  in aggre 
gate  conditions.  To  the  extent  that  a better  macromanagement  facilitates 
this  improvement,  it  may  well  have  a first order  effect  on  growth  if it  buys 
the  time  needed  for  microeconomic  reforms  to consolidate  and  deepen. 
Endnotes 
1.  See  Caballero  and  Hammour  (2005),  and  chapter  2  in Caballero  (2007). 
2.  Gross  job  flows  in  the U.S.  manufacturing  sector  for  the  period  1972:1-1993:4  are  from 
Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and  Schuh  (1996).  See  Caballero  and  Hammour  (2005)  for  a detailed 
description  of  the  data  used  to generate  the  figures. Table  4C1.3 
Private  Investment 
Emerging  Countries 
I.M  0.475  0.535  0.439 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dit  -0.739  -0.662  -0.793 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DitCit  -0.664  -0.159  -0.681 
(0.043)  (0.502)  (0.023) 
C?  -2.009  -3.403  -0.291 
(0.043)  (0.000)  (0.780) 
Obs./Countries  106/13  106/13  106/13 
Time Period  1990s  1990s  1990s 
Crisis  indicator  Growth  CA  Country Risk 
Long-Run  Crowding-Out 
Tranquil  -1.408  -1.424  -1.414 
Crisis  -2.672  -1.766  -2.627 
Advanced  Countries 
J.^  0.482  0.488  0.472 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Dit  -0.178  -0.170  -0.229 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DitCit  0.101  0.177  0.057 
(0.346)  (0.029)  (0.223) 
Cit  -1.357  -2.155  -0.332 
(0.064)  (0.001)  (0.373) 
Obs./Countries  297/18  297/18  297/18 
Time Period  1980-1990s  1980-1990s  1980-1990s 
Crisis  indicator  Growth  CA  Country Risk 
Long-Run  Crowding-Out 
Tranquil  -0.344  -0.332  -0.434 
Crisis  -0.149  0.014  -0.326 
Notes:  P-values  are  presented  in parentheses.  Covariates  include  the  (log  of)  relative  price 
of  capital  and  interactions  of  this  variable  with  the  crisis  indicator. 
Table  4C1.4 
Aggregate  Volatility  in  the United  States  and  Selected  EMU  Economies 
USA  EMU  (Median)  Germany  France  Italy 
a  (1980-2005)  1.77  1.63  1.62  1.15  1.16 
Note:  Growth  rate  of GDP  in  constant  local  currency  units. 
Source:  World  Development  Indicators  (WDI). 286  Caballero 
3.  Of  course,  sometimes  recessions  help  growth.  For  example,  a  sharp  decline  in  the  price 
of  oil may  well  free  some  oil-producing  countries  from  populist  regimes.  But  these  are  the 
exceptions  rather  than  the  rule. 
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